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This paper offers an account of how a researcher’s subjectivity might be seen as being 
stitched into the fabric of practitioner research. It utilizes Lacan’s notion of the mirror 
phase in suggesting that the subject of reflection is not quite what she might seem to be. The 
Freudian concept of desire is considered in relation to the motivations that reflective 
research models produce. This is contrasted with his concept of drive read against a 
research attitude where excessive belief in the linguistic forms of such research risks 
usurping the life they might seek to locate. The paper draws on a contemporary reading of 
the terms as offered by the Lacanian social commentator Slavoj Žižek. Two examples are 
provided of teachers carrying out practitioner research for higher degrees. These document 
the awkwardness the teachers experience in building conceptions of self through reflective 
work as personal ideas are processed in social space. 
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The happiest man on earth would be able to use the Mirror of Erised like a normal mirror, 
that is, he would look in to it and see himself exactly as he is… It shows us nothing more or 
less than the deepest desire of our hearts… However, this mirror will give us neither 
knowledge nor truth. Men have wasted away before it, entranced by what they have seen, or 
driven mad, not knowing if what it shows is real or even possible. (The late Professor Albus 
Dumbledore, in Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone by J. K. Rowling.)  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This paper seeks to better understand how practitioner research impacts on 
researchers’ sense of whom they are and the world in which they operate. It considers 
how the stories such researchers tell contribute to an evolving sense of self, but a self 
implicated in alternative understandings of social worlds. The paper commences by 
briefly reviewing the status of the individual in successive understandings of practitioner 
research. It suggests that the self-aware individual of Gadamerian hermeneutics as 
present in early versions of action research (e.g. Elliott, 1991) has been usurped by an 
individual rather less sure of his or her personal and social boundaries. A specific theme 
to be pursued relates to how individuals craft personal experience through socially 
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generated discourses. It is suggested that the researcher’s subjectivity is a function of this 
crafting. Yet this process cannot have clear outcomes since a strict separation between the 
individual and the external world can never be achieved within the discursive terrain of 
practitioner research. I thus draw an analogy with a psychoanalytic process where the 
researcher is seen as displaying some similarities to a client engaged in a sequence of 
psychoanalytic sessions, making sense of their world through talking about it and 
reflexively pointing to herself through the perspectives revealed. In psychoanalysis the 
client can be seen as constructing herself through building a story of who she is, a story 
that guides her in her actions. Likewise reflective writing within practitioner research, 
reports, generates and deceives, whilst actively redefining the researcher’s understanding 
of her self. The research intervenes in its central object, namely the person carrying out 
the research. 
By contrasting the Freudian terms desire and drive I seek to demonstrate how 
reflective accounts necessarily miss the reality they seek to portray, yet can stimulate 
alternative forms of satisfaction that produce new realities. According to Lacan, we are 
all motivated by desire, a desire that always mistake its object. The narratives we offer 
within reflective writing never catch up with us, but that need not stop us from trying. 
And our misses can nevertheless be informative about who we are or where we are. 
Narratives hold our desires in place even if they do not take us to the place that satisfies 
them. The stories we tell do not to pin down life for inspection but rather stimulate this 
life for future growth. Thus reflective writing can be viewed as a stimulator of desire 
through which our life unfolds. Yet there is also a risk that we begin to believe the stories 
we tell, as though they provide the final answer. There is a cost for the individual as a 
result of gearing in to the shared outer world. Through expressing oneself through social 
codes, procedures etc., personal and social boundaries are reshaped and hence cause a 
troubling compulsion to settle these boundaries. Žižek suggests that fetishistic satisfaction 
may be achieved by working to formulae, templates, set pieces, models, regulative 
frameworks, etc. He sees such behavior as a manifestation of drive where “we get caught 
into a closed, self propelling loop of repeating the same gesture and finding satisfaction in 
it” (Žižek, 2006, p. 63).  
I draw on work from two of my graduate students with view to outlining how the 
product of reflective inquiry is shaped by attitudes relating to how the individual 
constructs images of herself engaging in social worlds. A key element of the courses 
being followed was a focus on students’ understandings of who they were in professional 
settings and how they built analytical apparatus around accounts of their own actions, 
towards developing those actions. Both students to be considered explicitly engaged in 
Lacanian theory within professionally oriented higher degrees. (Aspects of the course 
processes are described elsewhere (Brown & Jones, 2001; Brown, Atkinson and England, 
2006)). In each case, the Lacanian analysis was targeted at building a more sophisticated 
account of their subjectivity. The first example describes a senior teacher carrying out 
practitioner-oriented research for a masters’ degree. Here the teacher investigated her 
own emotional response to a stressful situation with other teachers. It will be suggested 
that the teacher shifted from seeing reflective inquiry as a therapeutically oriented desire 
to work through feelings in relation to practice, to seeing the very expression of feelings 
as a useful tactic in shaping the space in which her practice took place. In the second 
example, a deputy head teacher from a primary school is caught up in a governmental 
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drive to raise school standards. In describing this within her doctoral thesis she finds 
herself struggling to hold on to her own professional integrity when her own practices are 
evaluated through a tight externally imposed regulative framework, prompting her to 
declare, “Why research good practice when the government is telling me what it is?” The 
analysis of this proposes that the teacher’s engagement in her reflective practice is 
accounted for in speech that oscillates between “sincere” personal reflection and a 
satisfaction derived through meeting the discursive demands of the framework. 
 
 
THE HERMENEUTIC ORIENTATION OF EARLY EDUCATIONAL ACTION 
RESEARCH 
 
 A common understanding of practitioner research in education that has prevailed 
from the early days of such work situates the researcher as a human reflecting on her 
immersion in some supposed research environment. The plan, implement and evaluate 
cycle of Lewin (quoted by Elliott, 1991), is but one of the many manifestations of a 
Gadamerian hermeneutic approach to research that comprises action, reflection on that 
action and thus revised action. Such reflections however are not merely a function of 
action. The situatedness of the researcher in itself impacts on how research is conceived, 
how events are constructed and then reported through time. Let us commence by focusing 
briefly on the reflective aspect of this hermeneutic set up.  
If I imagine myself as a researcher trying to make sense of the world I will have 
various thoughts in my mind. At some point, however, I may wish to share my thoughts 
in words spoken or written. But as I say something I may be more or less disappointed 
with how my thoughts sound once converted in to words. And through my attempts to 
reconcile what I thought with what I said, my understanding of the world might then be 
modified. So when I feel ready to speak again there may be some shift in the way in 
which I express myself as, in a sense, a different person is speaking. And so on, in a 
manifestation of the hermeneutic circle where understandings and explanations continue 
to disturb each other perhaps for as long as I live (Ricoeur, 1981).  
In this account of the hermeneutic circle one might suppose an individual who is 
visible to his or her self and well able to detect the ways in which explanatory words fail 
and to make adjustments accordingly. The human subject predicated in this 
understanding is Cartesian. The reflective task is conceptualized in terms of improvement 
from deficiencies that are self-evident. This version of events, however, lacks some key 
elements that have emerged in more recent theoretical work where the visibility of 
oneself to oneself is less evident and where the very notion of self arises through rather 
different procedures.  
Habermasian revisions to this model have pinpointed the failure of language to do 
an honest job. Language is inherited and is replete with many distortions resulting from 
particular modes of usage. Such distortions may have arisen, for example, from a 
government insisting on classifying educational practices in particular ways, or from 
historically derived modes of description ill-suited to contemporary practices. In such 
Habermasian perspectives the task of educational research is to detect these distortions 
and then remove them (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Gallagher, 1992; Brown & Roberts, 
2000). Foucault (e.g. 1997), meanwhile, was somewhat unconvinced by Habermas’ 
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capacity to get a consensus on where such distortions would arise, and shifted the task of 
research on to the individual resisting domination in its various forms at every 
opportunity. But, Althusser (1971) had already asked how it could be that individuals 
spot the discourses that happened to be interpellating them such that they could plot their 
escape. Althusser also felt that the aspiration to a happy conclusion where everything 
would be resolved was the biggest fraud of all. More recently Butler (1997), has queried 
why some discourses stick to individuals through “passionate attachments” whilst others 
are successfully resisted?  Habermas (e.g. 1976) was following Freud’s psychoanalysis in 
supposing that models of understanding were created to facilitate a cure, such as the 
removal of linguistic distortions to get a better understanding and a release from the 
torment of deficient rationalizations. A fuller review of these alternatives in the context of 
educational research is provided elsewhere (Brown & England, 2004). The next section 
contrasts Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis towards unfolding some alternative 
accounts of human subjectivity. 
 
 
THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF FREUD AND LACAN 
 
 Psychoanalytical thinking is predicated on a reality centered on two people talking 
in a doctor-client relation for the benefit of the client. This benefit however can be 
understood in various ways. Freud saw psychoanalytic consultancies as being about 
achieving a cure, by helping the subject to overcome the distortions. The unconscious 
was an ever-present phenomenon in such work but, according to Freud, this was like an 
iceberg making only a small part of itself visible. Freud’s work passed through many 
phases and his influence is diverse, spanning conflicting interpretations. Whilst originally 
motivated by activating neurological shifts in his patients his legacy might be better 
understood in retrospect in terms of enabling patients to reassess their pasts with view to 
opening up and making visible alternative paths for the future. Jacques Lacan (e.g. 2006) 
was the most famous of those who followed in his path and promoted the shift from bio-
scientific to narrative emphases in interpreting Freud’s work. (Homer, 2005, provides a 
useful introductory text to Lacan’s work.) This contrasted markedly with the approach 
taken by the ego psychology school in the United States led by émigré analysts including 
Freud’s daughter Anna after his death. In this school the ego was understood as a 
biological entity to be strengthened in line with a supposed model of good citizenship. 
The task for Lacan was not to remove supposed distortions in speech in the style of the 
Freuds and later Habermas but rather to learn from speech to see what it revealed. Such 
speech was scanned for symptoms of what Lacan called “the truth of desire”. Lacan 
(1990) once famously declared, “I always speak the truth”. By this he meant that 
whatever he, or anyone else, says reveals things about the speaker about which the 
speaker is not necessarily aware. By understanding how emotional flows of a patient 
were activated Lacan could, as an analyst, better understand how these shaped the 
patient’s actions that geared into the outer world. In this way actions were explained.  
These actions, however, were not corrected against a model that was supposed to be 
correct in advance.  
A key element of Lacan’s theoretical apparatus was his introduction of the mirror 
phase to fill in an apparent gap in Freud’s analysis of how the ego is formed (Lacan, 
 5 
2006, pp. 75-81). Freud (2002, p. 5) had earlier made the obvious point that: “an adult’s 
sense of self cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have undergone a 
process of development”. Yet how does this sense of self start to firm up? Further, much 
of a baby’s sense of where her body ends and where the world starts is clearly deluded. 
Yet what happens to create a more mature account of this, given that surely even adults 
have their fair share of paranoid delusions about who they are and how the world impacts 
on their actions? So often Freud’s own patients were seen as having developed unhelpful 
accounts of their histories that piloted them through both the real and imagined obstacles 
of their lives. Lacan’s account of this firming up was seen as being centered on a process 
akin to the young child looking into a mirror and saying “that’s me”. Future experiences 
were then oriented around that sense of self. Yet that self was most certainly a caricature, 
at best a holding device for an ego that would never be fully complete. And as such this 
was a deluded sense of self and Lacan had no interest in strengthening this through 
analysis. In the first Harry Potter movie, for example, Harry sees himself in the Mirror of 
Erised being comforted by his now dead parents, whilst his friend Ron Weasley sees 
himself as Quidditch champion and Head Boy. These alternative responses point to an 
insurmountable gap in the former and a somewhat frivolous one in the latter, neither of 
which promise a successful therapeutic outcome. The importance of the mirror is rather 
in what it misses rather than in what it succeeds in reflecting. If the psychoanalyst enables 
the patient to generate a lot of stories, it may be possible to detect a pattern of territory 
that gets avoided. Yet further for Lacan (2006), the gap results from the human baby 
being born too early, committing her to a long dependency on her parents and a 
susceptibility to the structures that govern her fellow humans. He further suggests that the 
act of her parents naming her throws her into a complex social network where a place for 
her has been prescribed in so many ways and the growing human’s assertions of self will 
always be a response to this initial set of expectations. And in turn her responses 
reflexively create through time an evolving account of the external world to which she 
continues to respond. 
Psychoanalysis is not entirely new to the field of education. Deborah Britzman  
(1998, 2003) has used the work of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein to investigate 
problematical and ambivalent aspects of teaching. Meanwhile, Pitt and Britzman (2003, 
p. 756) have argued that a growing body of psychoanalytic educational research, through 
its emphasis on concepts such as the unconscious, phantasy, affect and sexuality, has 
worked “to unseat the authorial capabilities of expression to account exhaustively for 
qualities of experience, to view history as a causal process, and to separate reality from 
phantasy”. Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkerdine (1984), Shoshona Felman 
(1987) and others have taken the work of Lacan to explore issues of pedagogy and 
learning. The authors in a book edited by Sharon Todd (1997) have discussed the place of 
desire and fantasy in teaching and learning. Other authors broaching this territory include 
Brown, Hardy and Wilson (1993), Appel (1996), Jagodzinski  (2001), Pitt  (1998), 
England and Brown (2001), Atkinson (2002; 2004), Brown and England (2004; 2005), 
Brown, Atkinson and England (2006) and Brown, Devine, Leslie, Paiti, Sila’ila’i, Umaki,  
& Williams (2007). 
Such work I suggest specifically supports practitioner research in education where 
the researcher is often concerned with providing a convincing account of his or her 
connectedness to the situation he or she is studying. Nevertheless, the purpose of such 
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research is often to generate new and fresh perspectives that enable courses of actions 
that might not have been detected so easily prior to the research. The task may be seen as 
being to disrupt as well as to confirm what we see. In particular, the reflective research 
process intervenes in its object. That is, the process of research transforms the human 
subject it sets out to document. In the sections that follow there is an attempt at using a 
psychoanalytic frame to provide a way of looking at research data that might open up the 
possibility of such fresh perspectives where notions of subjectivity become rather more 
complex.  
 
 
DESIRE AND DRIVE 
 
 In a recent lecture in London the Lacanian theorist Slavoj Žižek (2005) made a 
crucial distinction between the Freudian notions of desire and drive. The lecture has now 
been incorporated into a major work (Žižek, 2006). By contrasting these two notions I 
seek to distinguish between alternative modes of research enterprise; one in which 
researcher reflection locates and cultivates a gap between what one says and what one 
wants to say, and another where the researcher insists on closure between these. I will 
take each of these terms in turn, explaining their meaning and discussing them in relation 
to the fitting of research accounts. 
 
Desire 
 
 The notion of desire, perhaps better translated as “wish”, explains my motivation 
in terms of something that I want to acquire, even if I am not quite sure what this thing is 
exactly. In human sexuality, for instance we may know desire as a promise for the future, 
an unexplainable and seemingly youthful sparkle that draws us towards someone for a 
satisfaction not quite specified in advance. Indeed the mystery element is part of the 
appeal. Desire might also be expressed in relation to how I wish my future life to unfold 
more generally. Yet this desire and the way it shapes my progress into the future can 
never quite be captured. There is something beyond my reach that excites me, a surplus 
beyond that which I can express in words. Or, perhaps alternatively, if I take the desired 
outcome to be the yardstick, this surplus might be seen as a lack. That is, there is 
something that prevents me reaching the desired outcome. My explanation of how I could 
get what I want always misses something. This quandary, of course, applies to my 
developing sense of self and any work I might do on understanding what that is. I may 
have a sense of who I am striving to be. Perhaps, however, this is a positive reading of 
myself that I am trying to actualize in my current actions. I have a sense of the world and 
how my idealized self fits into this. My sense of where I am going is pleasurably tainted 
by the promise it holds. 
My sense of self, that is, my ego, however, is necessarily a function of how I see 
the world. My two dual fantasies, of myself, of the world, are inseparable in Lacan’s 
model. These fantasies are processed respectively through what Lacan calls the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic. My fantasy of self, my Imaginary identification, is the 
delusory mirror image I have of myself. Meanwhile, my fantasy of the world is processed 
though the Symbolic, the ideological apparatus that surrounds and engulfs me. Desire is 
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present in both of the fantasies as the gap (or the surplus) that separates the fantasy from 
the reality it seeks to capture. Lacan sees both fantasy and gap (surplus) as positive 
elements. The fantasy structures the reality that the individual perceives and lives. The 
gap serves as the motivation (a performative flavouring) that gives the fantasy meaning. 
For Lacan, there is a world “outside” of these two fantasies, what he calls the Real, but 
this is an “outside” beyond the scope of the individual’s grasp. The Real, by definition, 
resists any symbolic account. It is “that which remains the same in all possible (symbolic) 
universes” (Žižek, 2006, p. 26). The mutual formation of Imaginary and Symbolic shapes 
itself around the resistance of this Real. We can never quite capture ourselves in language 
but it is this “surplus of the Real over every symbolization that functions as the object-
cause of desire” (Žižek, 1989, p. 3). 
In fitting a research or scientific model to reality there remains an element of Je ne 
sais quoi that resists any sense that reality can be successfully processed and fully 
accounted for through a structural filter. Successive attempts to revise the filter merely 
alert me to alternative failings. As a practitioner researcher I tell stories of the world yet 
learn both through the way in which successive stories shape the world but also through 
the ways in which they seem to fail me. In the Lacanian account proposed the task is not 
so much concerned with getting the story right (to effect a cure/resolution) but rather it 
focuses on what can be learnt through making successive substitutions of the stories told, 
and it is through this that we learn something about the Real:  
 
In a first move the Real is the impossible hard core which we cannot confront directly, but 
only through the lens of a multitude of symbolic fictions, virtual formations. In a second 
move, this very hard core is purely virtual, actually non-existent, an X which can be 
reconstructed only retroactively, from the multitude of symbolic formations which are “all 
that there actually is” (Žižek, 2006, p. 24). 
 
It is not uncommon in a process of cyclical action research, for example, to suppose 
that actions at a later stage of the research might be more in line with expectations. The 
process of research has enabled the researcher to better predict outcomes to his strategies. 
Yet the researcher who arrives at these outcomes is a different person. The relationally 
defined ego is a function of the stories told and how they variously depict the researchers 
Imaginary and Symbolic identifications. The successive stories that “tell the truth” also 
transform, the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and perhaps the Real that hosts them. 
 
Drive 
 
 In the first instance Freud introduced “drive” as a central term in human sexuality 
to ensure a distinction with “instinct” as present in the animal world. For Freud “instinct” 
is a term that “implies a relatively fixed and innate relationship to an object” (Evans, 
1997, p. 46). Drives, however, are contingent on the person’s life history and thus vary 
according to biographical circumstances. But as Žižek was pointing out, drive also 
contrasts with desire. In Žižek’s account, drive is a learned acceptance, or an attitude, that 
the missing element that activates desire cannot, or need not, be captured. It is the 
fatalistic acceptance of this loss. As Evans (1997, pp. 46-47) puts it, “the real purpose of 
the drive is not some mythical goal of full satisfaction, but to return to its circular path, 
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and the real source of enjoyment is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit”. In 
Freud’s notion of the death drive, for example, desire has been deadened and the model 
of life that we pursue becomes a substitute for the fantasy that we never quite achieved. 
The death drive is a sacrifice of desire. It might almost be simplified as “going through 
the motions” and enjoying it as such, giving up on innovations that might disrupt existing 
routines and habits. One almost imagines an elderly colleague repeating lectures for years 
on end and resisting any institutional changes with a weary cry of “we tried that before”. 
Fukuyama’s (1992) notion of The End of History caused a theoretical stir a decade ago 
and might well be seen as an example of such a tendency. That is, the book supposed a 
final model of human society had been achieved and their was no need for further 
structural renewal to the liberal democracy that had already arrived and proven itself to 
be the most resilient of political arrangements. Further, changes could, according to 
Fukuyama, be seen as mere fine-tuning. The research model understood as a model that 
had got it right would be replacing the life that it had previously sought to capture. Or 
perhaps the researcher’s investment in the model might be seen as brushing aside 
evidence that works against this. In this mode work would be undertaken according to the 
model as though it really was a full account of the reality we are supposedly seeking. 
There is no gap. Reality is reshaped to fit the model. As such desire and drive can be seen 
as alternative attitudes and not necessarily sequential modes.   
 
For Lacan, whose psychoanalysis refuses firm distinctions between inside and outside, 
drive and desire might be seen as two sides of a Möbius strip, or alternative routes on a 
torus (Lacan, 2002). In a sense they are opposite, yet with a clear path between them. 
Žižek (2006, p. 7) presents it thus: “let us imagine an individual trying to perform some 
simple manual task  - say grab an object which repeatedly eludes him: the moment he 
changes his attitude, starting to find pleasure in just repeating the failed task, squeezing 
the object which, again and again, eludes him, he shifts from desire to drive”. How might 
this movement between attitudes be understood in relation to a practitioner researcher 
engaged in building analytical apparatus around their professional practice? I offer two 
examples in which teachers seek to reconcile personal reflections with social demands. 
 
 
I’M SHY 
 
 Emma, a senior teacher, was reviewing some situations in which she had been 
talking to colleagues. As part of her research for her masters she had sought to 
characterize various aspects of her professional self in discussion with fellow course 
members. She mentioned things such as shyness, conscientiousness, “at the end of 
ambition”, independent, self-contained, kind, sincere, etc. She was also aware of saying 
such things about herself to colleagues in various situations. The following statement 
from her reflective diary encapsulates her sense of self in these terms: “My identity 
comes from a mis-representation, a false persuasion of self that will stay with me as the 
ideal ego for the remainder of my life. I thus produce a fiction of myself”. In conversation 
with me and other course members Emma reflected on how in many situations, in her 
professional life and on the course she described herself to others as “shy”. She felt that 
this had become unhelpfully fixed as part of the fiction of herself that she had identified. 
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She reflected on how in listening to others she increasingly found herself asking the 
question “Why are you telling me this?” In the light of her reflections however she then 
turned the question around on herself and asked why it was that she was telling others 
that she was shy. Her conclusion was that it actually resulted in people being different in 
their attitudes towards her. Perhaps in some ways this was as may be expected. That is, it 
resulted in people being gentler towards her. There were, however, other aspects to these 
altered responses. Emma became aware that she sometimes said “I am shy” strategically. 
If, for example, she declared her shyness in our college sessions it, she realized, became 
an effective strategy in capturing space for attention and thus being more influential in 
meetings. As she became aware of herself doing this in college session she turned her 
attention to how she was acting in a similar fashion within her everyday professional life. 
And indeed she did locate situations where she was conscious of using overt expressions 
of unease as an approach to disarming colleagues and opening space for her own actions. 
How might this be reconciled with the notions of desire and drive? Emma’s 
statement “I am shy” can be understood in different ways. In Book IX of his Seminars, 
Lacan (2002, Seminar 1, pp. 8-9) considers the statements “I am lying” and “I think, 
therefore I am” in terms of how their meaning is carried if they are understood 
performatively. That is, when they are uttered, the utterance conceals “oblique goals” that 
transcend the literal content. Perhaps in the first instance “I am shy” is said sincerely. It is 
a reflective statement that in some ways encapsulates how the teacher understands the 
situation from her perspective. That is, she sees herself as shy and reports this as part of 
the reflective landscape she sees as relevant to her research. Or is it even, on this first 
occasion, in the first utterance, an experiment with a particular social gambit, a 
performance of a particular understanding of self, perhaps both in the professional 
situation and in her report of this at a college session? Could it be an example of her 
“speaking the truth” whilst being unaware of herself doing this? Later, however, Emma 
became explicitly aware of how it was functioning as a strategy. She realized that it 
impacted on those around her such that her own space for action was modified, by 
disarming colleagues, or eliciting sympathy from fellow students on the course. 
In her Imaginary identification she understood herself as shy. She did have the 
option of sticking with this story and reporting on her research environment where her 
shyness was one of the elements making up this environment. The subjectivity of 
practitioner research frequently introduces this sort of quandary where there is a need to 
decide how much a personal assessment fixes the reality of the space being described. 
Yet her engagement with a Lacanian analysis did result in her asking herself the question 
“Why am I saying this?” What exactly did she want from the other person? How did her 
statement impact on the situation being described? And in becoming aware of her 
statement being more than a statement of fact but instead being a statement that produced 
a social effect, her sense of the world in which she was operating shifted. That is, her 
Imaginary and Symbolic identifications, her sense of self, and her sense of the world both 
shifted. This move however also introduced a gap between the world as predicated by the 
authentic and sincere statement “I am shy” and the world in which the teacher became 
aware of this statement’s social effect. The recognition by the teacher of this gap offered 
a lever to make this gap yet wider where the teacher became more aware of the 
functioning of her own stories and the opportunities that this recognition provided. This 
resisted Emma’s own sense of self where she was shy and had declared that she was at 
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the “end of ambition”. She began to recognize that she could operate on her own stories 
about herself and as a result change the research landscape she was surveying. As she 
later expressed it:  
 
The truth of myself cannot be specified, as it has by its nature a plurality of formations. Of 
necessity, use of extracts of data is selective, producing ‘not one, but many silences and 
they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourse’ (quoting 
Foucault, 1991, p. 310)… I have been subconsciously selective in what I have absorbed 
from my cultural contexts through life’s journey, taking and weaving particular truths from 
unconscious desires. Our own ways of being then, link us to the past. Ironically, what is 
absent is perhaps what I should be interested in, but the ways in which each makes their 
own out of what they are given, are unpredictable.  
 
This quote points to the teacher’s awareness of her own ideological immersion and 
how her Imaginary sense of self has now been processed through the Symbolic order. 
This points to what Žižek (2006, p. 7) calls the “parallax nature of the gap between desire 
and drive”, a vivacious self image tempered by the cool functioning of the Symbolic 
order, which then produces transgressive excitements. This parallax is not a “polarity of 
opposites” since Imaginary and Symbolic are mutually formative (ibid). Desire and drive 
are implicated as sense of self and sense of world shape up in relation to each other. In 
switching between “I am shy” being said “sincerely” and it being said as a tactic the 
teacher is seemingly caught between a desire to live life anew and a drive to stick with 
locally proven strategies, where this switching is formative of both the individual 
experimenting (or resigning) and the social space perceived to be housing this oscillation.  
This oscillation (or formation) takes another shape in the second example where a 
teacher is experimenting with an imposed language that, at times, seems deceptively 
close to more personal modes of expression. 
 
 
WHY RESEARCH GOOD PRACTICE WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS 
TELLING ME WHAT IT IS? 
 
 Some civil servants are just like my loved ones…, from “Don’t worry about the 
government”, Talking Heads ’77. 
 
In recent years the British government has become very proactive in prescribing 
policies for schools. Such intervention has been widely interpreted as an assault on the 
professional integrity of teachers, where teachers themselves are required to police their 
own practice against externally defined agenda (Bottery & Wright, 1996; Brown & 
McNamara, 2005). Part of the armory of accountability procedures entails schools 
carrying out self-assessments, governed by the mantra: “the school that knows and 
understands itself is well on its way to solving any problems it has.  The school that is 
ignorant of its weaknesses, or will not, or cannot face up to them is not well managed” 
(OfSTED, 2000, p. 150). Detailed procedures were provided, instructing how such 
assessments were to be carried out in each school.  
Brenda is now a Headteacher in a primary school who carried out practitioner 
research for a professionally oriented doctorate in education. By recording her own 
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actions she was able to reflect on how these actions impacted on the definition of her 
professional role and on the terrain in which this was enacted. Previously as deputy in the 
same school she had been responsible for self-assessment and this provided the theme for 
her research. In assessing lessons presented by her staff she followed the procedures. She 
had also attended three-day training programme for such assessors. Yet Brenda found 
herself asking whether such procedures could be carried out to the letter. As part of her 
research she sought to experiment with the template provided to experience and report on 
the affective dimension of such compliance. Below I offer some extracts from Brenda’s 
reflective writing produced during her attendance at the training sessions. These extracts 
point to the difficulties she experienced in occupying the official discourse, as it were, 
whilst reconciling this with more personal reflections made during the practitioner 
research process. This very distinction between discursive styles, however, proved 
somewhat tricky as the language of her more personal accounts increasingly made use of 
the official vocabulary. It became less clear whether her personal use of language 
embraced or resisted her deepening immersion in the official vocabulary.  
  
Throughout the three days participants were expected to watch a number of videoed 
extracts of lessons and produce “Lesson Evaluation Forms”. Initially the 
descriptions and marks on a scale 1 to 7 varied considerably.  We worked in groups 
but were asked not to confer initially. I was mildly reprimanded for talking during 
one video, studious attention was necessary. We were expected to complete our 
forms and then confer.  Some wrote furiously others were more reticent. However, it 
was in the scoring that the course leader was interested.  Each table was asked for a 
group conclusion, which involved considerable discussion on most tables. The initial 
video split the group I was working with and some members had to mark the level 
down, including me.  All members had to move some of their marks in one direction 
or another. Critical argument ensued, “How can you say that?” and “How can that 
tell you that?” One trainee wrote that, “There are some weaknesses in teaching that 
mean that some pupils do not understand”. Comments from the group included, 
“How do you know?” and “Do you not find that some pupils don’t understand in 
every lesson?” Indeed, one comment was if they all understood perhaps the lesson 
would not be stretching enough.  
However after much discussion a group decision was reached.  All the results 
were collected, next the trainer gave the “right grades”. Members of our group were 
pleased that we were close and there were a few smug comments of “I told you.” 
This approach continued over five videos of lessons. Interestingly much of the 
verbal evaluation was unfavorable. A teacher’s voice intonation was heavily 
criticized and a P.E. lesson was “torn to bits”. My neighbor stated, “I would never 
allow my lessons to be recorded as even the good lessons are found at fault.” It 
seemed that negative remarks were easier to give than praise or that the lessons were 
particularly poor. The latter was not reinforced by the marks, which were generally 
around average. The official grades were lower to start than the majority given by 
the groups and no lesson was pronounced as excellent in any area.  
 
Such comments point to an apparent demand for compliance in line with tightly specified 
procedures that were seen as producing the correct results. Brenda felt that her own 
professionalism was on the line with her conceptions of what constituted good education 
not fitting well with the new official doctrine. She felt at a complete loss when her then 
head teacher declared:  “Surely you know a good lesson from a bad one?”  As Brenda 
admitted: “This was difficult to answer because simplistically I felt I did”. Yet this new 
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doctrine seemed to be as much about teachers learning to accept control of their practice 
as it was about producing better lessons. And the account seemed to point at some of the 
teachers deriving pleasure from working “correctly” within the exercises. Yet Brenda 
remained ambivalent: 
 
I appeared to be uncomfortable with the ideology proposed by the government. I 
wanted to strive to be a better teacher. I felt I had it within my power to work out the 
best routes to take. Now I was to be told which route to take and how to travel it.  
How would I accommodate the mismatch between my perceived reality and this 
proposed ideology? Would it entail a change in my ideological stance? Or could I 
work with a mismatch?   
 
Yet Brenda’s attempt at working through these conflicts led to some surprising 
results. 
 
One of my (new) roles was Assessment and Evaluation Coordinator in which I was 
regarded as very efficient. I had computer files full of graphs recording and 
predicting results in tests. In interviews with the LEA inspector responsible for 
target setting satisfaction with the analysis of results was always forthcoming.  
Official reports of visits always left me with a feeling of satisfaction. I felt that I was 
doing a good job… Indeed the document contained a number of health warnings, 
such as “it is important to recognize that data analyses provide few, if any, answers” 
and “despite all the fuss about targets and the use of data, it is important to 
remember that children do not grow taller by being measured”.  My cynicism was 
probably softened by these remarks. I actually enjoy playing with numbers and data, 
so after voicing the negative aspects to the course leader I completed the necessary 
work satisfactorily. In fact my diary entries say little about this section of the 
training. The effect of performance tables on teacher and children was important to 
me and I had voiced my opinions, which were met with nods from other managers. 
…(but) here I (had) accepted an imposed idea that I felt did not really address 
educational improvement.  Yet I gained pleasure through the praise I received about 
my competence.   
 
These thoughts point to an increasingly fatalistic acceptance of the new strictures where 
small pleasures are derived from getting the game right or finding space for “playing with 
numbers”. Brenda is not so much embracing or resisting the strictures as becoming part 
of them at practical level whilst still attempting to distance herself from them at an 
intellectual level. Her very identity became a function of governmental apparatus where 
individual and social could no longer be readily distinguished. Žižek (2006, p. 6) 
pinpoints how the individual presents herself as a manifestation of the social order: 
 
The field of social practices and socially held beliefs, is not simply on a different level from 
individual experience, but something to which the individual has to relate, which the 
individual himself has to experience as an order which is minimally “reified”, externalised 
… the gap between the individual and the “impersonal” social dimension is to be inscribed 
back within the individual himself: this “objective” order of the social substance exists 
only insofar as individuals treat it as such, relate to it as such (Žižek’s emphasis).  
 
Brenda had seemingly become part of the social structure from which she was seeking to 
distance herself: “My first performance management objective was to gain accreditation 
in school self-evaluation.  This was to enable me to evaluate teachers’ performance for 
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performance management and for the school’s general improvement”. This extract is 
quite striking in its resplendent use of the official discourse. Words such as “performance 
management”, “accreditation”, “school self-evaluation”, and “improvement” are 
sprinkled liberally. Yet it is not clear how much irony is intended. In being obliged to use 
such terms so often in her professional life, where her own performance is evaluated 
through a particular style of usage, is it possible for Brenda to remain distanced from the 
words that she uses? Žižek (1989, pp. 27-33) had earlier argued that contemporary 
ideological structures only function successfully if subjects act with a certain degree of 
cynical distance. Ideological functioning, he suggests, is premised on a growing gap 
between our discursive production and associated activity, there is no necessary 
relationship between reality and its symbolization (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). 
Ideologies incorporate their own cynicism in advance since such openness undermines 
attempts to distance oneself and be critical from a supposed outside.  
 
(I)n different historical circumstances it would undoubtedly have subversive effects; today 
however, in the era of cynicism, ideology can afford the secret of its functioning (its 
constitutive idiocy, which traditional, pre-cynical ideology had to keep secret) without in 
the least affecting its efficiency (Žižek, 1996, p. 200, Žižek’s emphasis).  
 
Meanwhile, full on, face value compliance, he has argued, leads to a collapse of the 
structure. He cited the example of Jaroslav Hašek’s The Good Soldier Švejk, in which a 
soldier creates havoc by following rules to the letter (Žižek, 1997, p. 22). (This character 
might be seen as a prototype for Forest Gump also discussed by Žižek (1996, pp. 200-
201).) Cynical distance, he had further argued, is a way “to blind ourselves to the 
structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if 
we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them (Žižek, 1989, p. 33, Žižek’s 
emphasis). As Butler (2005, (p. 5) explains in his account of Žižek’s notion of fantasy: “It 
is not so much in what we believe as in our external practices that fantasy is to be found.” 
In situations of ideological immersion we have no choice other than to assume a cynical 
or ironical distance that sustains at a practical level the ideology perhaps being resisted at 
an intellectual level. Yet, Žižek (1996, pp. 207-208) later teases out a more precise 
distinction between the two positions of cynic or ironist and considers the potential for 
movement between these. He suggests that these two positions each activate their own 
potential deadlock:  
 
The cynic reduces ideological chimeras to raw reality, he is in search of the real ground of 
elevated ideological fictions; whereas the ironist entertains a suspicion that perhaps reality 
itself is not real but always already structured as a fiction, dominated, regulated by an 
unconscious fantasy. Each of these two attitudes involves its own trap; the cynic’s, a naive 
belief in ultimate reality outside the cobweb of symbolic fictions; the ironist’s, the opposite: 
the reduction of reality itself to a fiction. 
 
Brenda had attempted to play it straight but with seditious intent in a situation that 
seemingly presented itself as a totalitarian coup of the discursive territory. That is, she 
sought to follow the rules to the letter to see if such tactics could rumble the core by 
revealing in a direct way their ridiculous functioning if pursued with mechanical 
compliance. Yet the very structures promoted a cynical distance in a number of ways. For 
example, by offering health warnings about their own shortcomings, or by occupying 
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positions of “common sense” that so obviously concealed strategic moves, or by 
distracting her with pleasurable tasks where she could achieve localized success, Brenda 
could not fail to move to and fro between consent and denial, but in so doing she enacted 
at a practical level the very structures that she sought to discredit at an ideological level. 
She would have needed either monumental cynical powers, or fantastic powers of 
compliance, to not assume a cynical or ironical position. Brenda’s desire to hold on to her 
own professional aspirations was translated into a social language shaped around this new 
order, which in a sense fixed the parameters and thereby supported the success of the new 
social order. And the pursuit within these parameters became the new source of pleasure, 
not quite as pure as the driven snow, but driven nonetheless. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
So then, what does a reflective researcher see when they look into the mirror and how 
much control do they have over what they see? Lacan’s mirror locates an Imaginary 
identification that we should be cautious in promoting. Nevertheless, an examination of 
how the mirror works can be quite informative. The reflective stories that the researcher 
tells provide material for analysis. Yet the “reflections” are performative, not mere 
neutral reflections. They represent engagement in the social life being reported. Analysis 
can be directed at examining the nature of the truth told and how this truth might be seen 
as concealing or activating other stories. The status of this story needs to be considered 
carefully insofar as there are difficulties in supposing that the story is in some way 
representative of the person. The story can also be seen as performative or generative of 
the reality it seeks to depict. The story can have material effects without necessarily 
having positive content. The story can also be seen as a mask. The chain of writings can 
create an illusion that there is an underlying content with an isomorphic relation between 
signifiers and signifieds. The articulation of multiple reflective extracts perhaps creates 
an illusion that they surround a singular identity. 
 It is through this route that Lacan differs from Habermas and his particular route 
from Freud. As seen, whilst Habermas like Freud aspires to some sort of resolution, 
Lacan’s account lacks Freud’s victory narratives. Or rather, for Lacan, psychoanalytic 
work is more of a continual and permanent aspect of self-realizing, or a recurrent 
response to perceived expectations. The gap is never closed. This process comprises an 
on-going redefinition of self and of the world that shapes itself around that self. In this 
account human identity is never fixed and furthermore you are never able to say what you 
want to say because the words are not your own. Or at least ownership is in a state of 
permanent dispute. This drives the subject to keep on talking, to offer yet more accounts, 
to re-frame her intentions again and again successively, always anticipating the true 
version of her life but never quite getting there. And it is in this re-writing that her sense 
of self evolves through the narratives that she offers, motivated by desires that aspire to 
renewal and drives that find pleasure in repetition. 
As has been seen in the two examples there is some slippage between language 
used in personal reflection and that used in socially constructed space. This pointed to 
some lack of clarity about whether language was being used sincerely or not. Indeed the 
term “sincerity” implies a self-knowledge that may not have been readily available to the 
 15 
individuals concerned. In the first example, the teacher took time to reflect on how a 
feeling of unease with colleagues gave rise to an expression of this unease, which then 
impacted on the space she had seen as the source of that unease. And through this route 
the nature of the uneasiness was transformed. There was a time dimension through which 
the feeling was recast as a tool. This tool shaped a new reflection in which the seeming 
dichotomy of sincere or not was effaced since the expression, combined with reflection 
on it, had changed both the individual and the space she occupied. In the second example 
the official guidance kept tricking the teacher in to believing that she was already using 
the required language. The teacher was attempting to distance herself from complete 
immersion in the official discourses but found herself sucked in through a need to use a 
language and associated practices that were officially sanctioned in her communication 
with colleagues. The new documentation had also masked itself in a language of common 
sense. The virtue of new practices was presented as self-evident. 
In both situations the teachers became aware of how their use of language 
transformed the parameters that had given rise to this use and as a result the teachers 
became caught in an uncertain space between what Žižek defines as cynical and ironical 
positions. Nevertheless, the individual can achieve pleasure (jouissance) through 
experimenting with this discursive material and with one’s relation to it. And it is the 
pursuit of this pleasure that shapes the portrayals of self that gear into the outer world. In 
the two examples the source of jouissance became a function of the mode of participation 
in the linguistic games being played out in the social domain, rather than as seemed at the 
outset, being about feeling more at ease in professional interactions in the first example, 
or promoting quality lessons in the second. Desire shifted to drive. For Emma the act of 
saying “I’m shy” became a commodification of emotional exchange that stimulated 
alternative pleasures. Brenda, meanwhile, by attempting to distance herself intellectually 
from the official discourses found satisfaction in this attempted distancing which was 
always impossible at a practical level. 
In any enunciation, however, there can be a lack of clarity as to from where the 
subject is speaking.  What fantasy does the speaker have of her own speaking subject and 
of whom she is speaking to? And what does she think that that listener expects? And thus 
the attitude shifts with this sliding between subject positions variously, ironic, cynical, 
sincere, correct, deluded, etc. The very enunciation activates a shift in who is speaking. 
The speaker has an imaginary sense of self of speaking from a position to a position but 
both positions are multiply contingent. We are cushioned such that our rationales for 
what we are doing are always at some distance from the actuality of our actions since 
“our vision of reality is anamorphically distorted … which accounts for the very 
multiplicity of appearances of the same underlying Real” (Žižek, 2006, p. 24, Žižek’s 
emphasis). “This means that, ultimately, the status of the Real is purely parallactic and, as 
such, non-substantial; is (sic) has no substantial density in itself, it is just a gap between 
two points of perspective, perceptible only in the shift from one to the other (ibid). As 
Žižek (1996, p. 194) reflects: “when I speak, I always constitute a virtual place of 
enunciation from which I speak, yet this is never directly ‘me’”. There is a difference 
between what you say and what you do but, as seen, for Žižek, it is what you do that 
delineates the fantasies that govern who you are but the form of your behavior escapes 
you, the mirror is cracked sending signals at unexpected angles, and, meanwhile, you can 
never be quite sure how what you do will be interpreted by others. “The lesson to be 
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drawn from this concerning the social field is above all that belief, far from being an 
“intimate’, purely mental state, is always materialized in our effective social activity: 
belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality” (Žižek, 1989, p. 36). 
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